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A bill was filed to construe the limitations set forth in a class
gift. Of the testator's seven brothers and sisters who originally
comprised the class, five were living when the will was executed,
two brothers having died prior thereto. The heirs of the deceased
brothers claimed shares of the estate, alleging that they were within the limits set forth in the class gift. The language in question
states:
I devise to my brothers and- sisters, living at the time of
my death, or to the heirs of brotners and sisters who may
precede me in death, all of my real estate in the County
of Benton, State of Indiana, described as follows:....
Originally, the lower court had found that the intent of the testator
to exclude heirs of his deceased brothers was evidenced by his
limiting the gift to his living brothers and sisters. Therefore, the
heirs of the deceased brothers could not share in the estate. Reversing the lower court's decision, the appellate court held that
without the testator's manifest intent, heirs could not be disinherited. If the words of a will are ambiguous, they are to be construed in favor of the heirs, against disherison. McAvoy v. Sammons, 224 N.E. 2d 323 (Ind. 1967).
The instant case presents the problem of determining which
heirs fulfill the limitations set forth in the class gift. In this case,
the class limitation is the contingency of predeceasing the testator. If the class members die before the testator, a second named
group of possible heirs take in their stead.
In general, when a devise is made to a class in which some
members have predeceased the testator, the surviving members
take the shares of those who died. However, if the testator makes
specific provisions to deal with the failure of beneficiaries to survive him, this language must be given effect., Problems arise
when the language employed is ambiguous and incomplete. In the
landmark English case, Christopherson v. Naylor, 2 the court de1.
2.

See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.52,

1 Mer. 320, 35 Eng.Rep. 693 (Cl.

1816).

§ 22.53

(A.

J. Casner ed. 1952).
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veloped a theory which distinguished between original and substitutional gifts to a class. The language to be construed contained
the following provision:
. . .to each and
and sisters . . ..
decease .... But
or sisters or any

every child and children of my brother
which shall be living at the time of my
if any child or children of my said brother
of them. . . , shall happen to die in my

lifetime, and leave any issue lawfully begotten of the body
or bodies of any such child or children living at or born in
due time after his or their decease, then in such case the
legacy or legacies hereby intended for such child or children
so dying shall be upon trust for and I give and bequeath
the same to him, her or their issue; such issue taking only
the legacy or legacies which his, her or their parents or
parent would have been entitled to, if living at my decease

..

.

s

The English court held that the original gift was to benefit only
those persons who satisfied the group limitation, namely, the testator's nieces and nephews. The provision for their issue was substitutional and, as with substitutional gifts, could not be effective
unless there had been a gift to the original beneficiaries. If the
original beneficiaries in the Christopherson case were dead at the
execution of the will, they could not be considered to have taken
as'original beneficiaries. Thus their issue could not be substituted.4
Therefore, the court set forth the theory that unless the devise
specifically includes the issue of these deceased class members as
original beneficiaries, they are excluded. Only the issue of those
class members who omea after the execution of the will can share
in its benefits. Since the gift to the issue is substitutional, there
must be a prior gift to the ancestor.5 A number of courts, when
faced with this situation, have followed the line of reasoning deyelped in Christopherson.a However, others have found both the
gift to the issue and the gift to the ancestors to be original.7
Due to the lack of consistent decisions, courts must carefully evaluate the words of devise, the language of the rest of the will,
and doctrines of testamentary construction. 8
Because the appellate court, in the instant case, felt that the
d. at 693.
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5
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Su pra
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1,

at 404.

Id. at 404.
In re Throm's Estate, 378 Pa. 159. 106 A.2d 818 (1954); Love v. Love. 208 S.C.
363, 38 S.E.2d 231 (1946): Tiffany v. Emmet. 24 R.T 411. 53 A. 281 (1902).
6.

6.
7.

Mfr. Nat'l Bank v. McCoy, 212 A.2d 5.1 (RI..

1965) : In

re Belser's Will, 23 Aise.

176. 199 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1960)
In re Burggraf's Estate, 12 Misc. 152, 176 N.Y.S.2d 905,
(1958) : Gardner v. Knowels. 48 R.T. 231, 136 A. 883 (1927): Baldwin v. Tucker, 61
N.J.Eq. 412, 48 A. 547 (1901)
Outcalt v. Outralt. 42 N.J.Eq. 500. 8 A. 532(1887).
8. Hancock v. Maynard, 72 Ind. App. 661, 126 N.E. 461 (1920): 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, Supra note 1, at 406.
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language of the will was so ambiguous as to permit two possible
interpretations, it based the decision on applicable canons of construction. 9 Trying to discover the testator's intent,10 the court
felt that the absence of specific language to disinherit was an
indication of inclusion of the issue in question. The canons also
presume inclusion, requiring disherison to be specifically stated."
Applying another rule of construction, the court may distribute in
accordance with the law of intestacy, 12 which enable the issue of
the deceased to inherit.
If the language of the will is not so ambiguous as to obscure
the intent of the testator, it must be given effect. 3 A careful
reading of the language used by the testator in the instant case
would tend to disprove the need to resort to artificial canons.
His will contained the following provision: ". . . devise to my
brothers and sisters, living at the time of my death ........
The
testator imposed survivorship as a condition of the gift. Those
brothers and sisters not fulfilling this condition can not be included in the class,' 4 and their issue should not inherit.
The testator's language further contained the clause, "...
or
to the heirs . . .-.
" These words are considered to be words of
substitution." The word "or", as it appears in this commonly used
phrase, is usually interpreted in its natural disjunctive sense, designating those who take by substitution.-6 Another possible consideration is that a devise is void when made to persons who are
dead before the will is executed. Unless there are statutory provisions to alter such situations, the devise to the deceased brothers
7
would be void.'
It would seem that the circumstances surrounding the class
gift in the instant case would tend to support a devise to the
living brothers and sisters, with an alternative gift to the issue
of the deceased brothers. By its decision favoring two groups of
9. The canons of construction employed by the lower court in its decision of the
instant case were the following: 1) determination of the testator's intent. 2) presumption against disinherision, and 3) distribution iccording to the laws of intestacy when
tile Intent of the testator cannot be determined.
10. Indus. Nat'l Bank v. Clark. 204 A.2d 310 (R.T., 1964) : Spicely v. Jones, 199 Va. 703,
101 S.E.2d 567 (1958); McCoy v. Houck, 180 Ind. 634. 99 N.E. 97 (1912).
11." Guipe v. Miller, 94 Ind. App. 314, 180 N.E. 760 (1932): McCoy v. Houck, Supra
note 10, at 101; Crew v. Dixon, 129 Ind. 85, 27 N'.E. 728 (1891).
12. Guipe v. Miller, Supra. note 11, at 764 ; Hancock v. Maynard. Supra note 8, at 454.
1. Churchfield v. First Nat'l Bank, 418 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1966) : Indus Nat'l Bank v.
Clark, Supra note 10, at 312; Spicely v. Jones. Supro note 10, at 569.
14. In re Fitzpatrick's Estate, 21 N.Y.App.2d 946. 2,1 N.Y.S.2d 3,9 (1964).
15. Fatheree v. Gregg, 20 Ill.2d 620, 170 N.E.2d 6nA (1960) : Brown v. Neeld. 26
N.J.Super. 240, 97 A.2d 718 (1953) ;,In re Spruce'a%Will. 114 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1952) ; Pearson v. Olson, 310 Ill.252, 141 N.E. 736 (1923).
16. Howard v. Batchelder, 143 Conn. 328. 122 A.2d r07 11956) : In re Brunet's Estate.
:14 Cal.2d 105, 207 P.2d 567 (1949) ; Batrtlett v. Mut. Ben. iire lns. Co., 358 II. 452, 191
N.E. 501 (1934) ; Boys v. Boys, 328 Ill.147, 159 N.E 217 (1927).
17. Mfr. Nat'l Bank v. McCoy, Supra note 7, at 69.
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original takers, the lower court possibly read "or" to have been
interchangeable with "and". Although courts have done so in the
past,18 they are inclined to do so only when this carries out the
intent of the testator.1 9 Generally, "and" and "or" are given their
common meanings unless this construction obviously is contrary to
the intent of the testator.2 0 It is not the job of the court to rewrite -a will so as to make it most fair to all concerned, but
rather to enforce the will of the testator as he instructed.
The appellate court states that this is a case of first impression in Indiana and the question involved could become one of
significant economic import. Conflicting court opinions within the
same jurisdiction indicate that a state supreme court decision or
legislative action would be helpful. Some aid is necessary to clarify who takes under a class gift which provides for an alternative
if a contingency is fulfilled as to part of the members. In North
Dakota there is neither reported case law precedent nor legislative pronouncement. Therefore, careful legal draftsmanship is necessary to avoid the possible exclusion of persons the testator intends to include in his class gift.
PAULA 0. HosicK

CONCLUSIVENESS

OF

JUDGMENTS-PERSONAL

INJURY-DISCRE-

COURT-Plaintiff brought an action for injuries he
sustained in a fall on the defendant's stairway. A Stipulation of
dismissal was executed by the attorneys for both parties and the
trial court ordered judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Three
years later the%trial court granted plaintiff an order setting aside
and vacating the judgment. At the time of the judgment, the
plaintiff had not been aware of an injury to his hip resulting
from the fall. Surgery and extensive hospitalization were ncessary
for treatment of the hip injury. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held circumstances justified vacating the judgment. Simons v.
Schiek's, Inc., 275 Minn. 132, 145 N.W.2d 548 (1966).
Once a final judgment is obtained against a tortfeasor it is
TION OF

THE

18. In re Braun's Estate. 256 Ia. 55, 126 N.W.2d 318 (1964); Howard v.
Supra note 16, at 311: In re Ginsburgii's Estate, 102 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1950);
Bank v. Morrison, 7 N.J.Super. 333, 70 A.2d 88S (1949) ; Smith v. Dellitt, 249
N.E. 113 (1911).
19. In re Braun's Estate, Supra note 18, at 321; Howard v. Batchelder,
16, at 211; Nat'l State Bank v. Morrison, Supra note 18, at 893.
20. In re Braun's Estate, Supra note IR. at 321 ; Howard v. Batclielder,
16, at 311; Bo)s v. Boys, Supra note 16, at 219.
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